A Behavior-Change model of jihadi media: The Information-Motivation-Behavioral skills framework and TTP video propaganda

Introduction

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) are an Islamist terrorist organization that has been active in Pakistan and Afghanistan for close to two decades. Despite counterterrorism efforts, the militant group has remained a mainstay in the Pakistani security environment. Historically allied with the Taliban who offer them refuge, the group has become emboldened and more dangerous following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, with nearly 300 documented attacks since 2021 (Afzal, 2022). Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad have also worsened as Pakistan accuses the Taliban government of sheltering the TTP (Firdous, 2025).

We seek to provide a theoretical framework connecting the TTP’s messaging to behavioral outcomes in their audience. Terrorist groups pursue their objectives by coercing states, defining goals, and mobilizing followers (Beck, 2015; Tilly, 2004); for ideologically driven organizations media is a constitutive element of identity, reproducing the group’s worldview for its members and audience. Strategic elements such as safe harbor in Afghanistan, criminal revenue and tribal networks help explain the group’s resilience but not its messaging. Prior research shows that organizations with religious ideology and community support last longer (Blomberg et al., 2011; Cronin, 2009; Gaibulloev et al., 2024). Religion and ethnicity-based ideologies are also linked to operational behaviors such as target selection and levels of violence (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Carson & Turner, 2024; Drake, 1998; Piazza, 2009).

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The TTP present a significant case because their geographical and political position differs from the more studied ISIS and Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda operates as a transnational network whose ideological outlook emphasizes global jihad (Eikmeier, 2007). ISIS, emerging in the context of state collapse in Iraq and Syria, built its appeal around territorial statehood and shocking violence (Baele et al., 2020). TTP is a non-state insurgent group, embedded in tribal dynamics along the Durand Line, that challenges a Muslim democratic state ideologically and territorially. Without the theological authority of Al-Qaeda or the banner of the caliphate, the TTP’s communication strategy leans on religious appeals, claims of Islamic governance, and anti-democratic sentiment. What does the TTP tell viewers about its identity, goals and enemies? How does it rouse its viewers to action? How does it teach viewers what actions to undertake? And what role does anti-democratic content play across these three areas?

This study analyzes a corpus of 44 TTP videos released between 2009 and 2020 using the Information-Motivation-Behavioral Skills (IMB) model presented by Fisher and Fisher (1992). Originally developed in health psychology to explain behavioral change, the IMB framework has since been applied to models of political messaging and jihadi media (Lemieux et al., 2014; Wilson & Lemieux, 2019). We use it to disaggregate the types of content that TTP videos contain; how they inform audiences about the group’s views and goals, how they motivate participation through identity-based appeals, and finally, how they model the behavioral skills required to support the organization.

The paper proceeds as follows: after reviewing the literature and introducing the theoretical framework, we describe our research design and methods, present findings organized around the three IMB components and conclude with a discussion of theoretical and policy implications.

Background: Tehreek-e-taliban Pakistan

The TTP is the largest Pakistani terrorist umbrella organization – composed of various factions and commanders under the label of the Pakistani Taliban (Weinbaum, 2014). Their core objective is to overthrow the Pakistani government and establish an Islamic government adhering to shariah; secondary goals include supporting the Afghan Taliban and resisting the Pakistani state through jihad (Afzal, 2018; Crenshaw & Robinson, 2025; Jadoon, 2021). The group formed in 2007, quickly reaching its apex in terms of insurgency and fatalities in 2009 (Abbas, 2008; Manzar, 2010; PIPS, 2021), but the TTP weakened between 2015 and 2019 due to public backlash, leadership losses, and infighting (Jadoon & Sayed, 2022). Even so, they continue adapting, deprioritizing civilian targets in 2018 under the new leader Noor Wali Mehsud, and by 2020, claiming their ambitions were limited to Pakistan (Sayed & Hamming, 2021). On the TTP’s longevity and threat, Jadoon (2021, p. 21) writes:

From the Pakistani perspective, the TTP, even with its diminished capacity, will continue to pose a threat to the Pakistani state and its civilians as long as it propagates its extremist ideology and continues to recruit and conduct attacks within the country.

Beyond domestic activity, the group is also closely aligned with other South Asian jihadists. Since its inception, the TTP has maintained alliances with Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban and has collaborated with groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Fair, 2011; Tankel, 2016). Al-Qaeda provides ideological guidance and material support, while the TTP assists Al-Qaeda and Taliban’s military operations (Bergen & Tiedemann, 2013; Biberman & Zahid, 2019). Since its resurgence, the TTP has brought other jihadi groups under its fold, boasting over 42 partners (Firdous, 2025; Giustozzi, 2025).

The non-state group has subsisted in a dynamic strategic and political environment, taking advantage of the 2021 Taliban victory in neighboring Afghanistan by using it as a haven (Akhtar & Ahmed, 2023; Jadoon & Sayed, 2022). Subsequent Pakistani attempts to negotiate a ceasefire with the group have stalled (Firdous, 2025; Khan, 2025; Rana, 2022). Since 2021, the TTP’s insurgency has intensified, claiming the lives of more than 500 Pakistani law enforcement personnel (Afzal, 2022). Attacks continued in 2023 as relations between Pakistan and Afghan Taliban worsened: Islamabad accused the Taliban of supporting the TTP, while Kabul objected to Pakistan’s announcement that it would deport some 1.7 million undocumented Afghans (Associated Press, 2023). While Pakistan’s counterterrorism response emphasized military action, recent programs have included curriculum reform and reintegration programs (Hussain, 2025). The country has also carried out cross-border airstrikes on TTP targets in Afghanistan; in 2025 Noor Wali Mehsud reportedly survived a targeted strike in Kabul. The same year, General Munir, head of Pakistani armed forces, warned the Afghan Taliban against supporting the TTP (Ahmed, 2025).

Predominantly based in northern Pakistan, the TTP maintains influence in urban centers like Karachi through criminal networks (Yusuf, 2014). Funding comes through illicit activities, taxation, and foreign support (Biberman & Zahid, 2019; Davis, 2022; Iqbal & De Silva, 2013). TTP recruit from all Pakistani provinces, often by luring unemployed youth with payments, offering criminal incentives, or adopting members from other groups (Crenshaw & Robinson, 2025; Elahi, 2019). The group also recruits directly from madrasas and marginalized regions (Tahir & Jadoon, 2025).

The TTP has an extensive propaganda operation, possessing its own media cell, Umar Media (Feyyaz, 2015). Using radio, social media, magazines, pamphlets, and videos, the group disseminates content in multiple languages, including Pashto, Urdu, and Punjabi (Crenshaw & Robinson, 2025). This media effort articulates political goals, outlines strategies, and promotes the group’s legitimacy. The group maintains a regular presence on social media platforms (Bowes, 2024). In 2016, the outfit launched its first official magazine, followed by a website in 2020 (Jadoon, 2021). Mehsud’s leadership oversaw the expansion of the TTP’s propaganda apparatus (Tahir & Jadoon, 2025).

As the group continues to build its capability and reach, the TTP is likely to remain a significant actor in Pakistan–Afghanistan relations. Tribal ties, local grievances over military operations, and resentment linked to conflict in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa create pockets of sympathy, while the group also benefits from support and safe havens in parts of Afghanistan. Understanding the TTP’s propaganda strategy can help inform research on jihadi audiences and counter-narrative efforts. Here we present a framework to analyze the message and the psychological processes it targets.

Literature Review

Scholarship on jihadi communication shows that extremist Islamist organizations use media to construct simplified worldviews, mobilize support (Salem et al., 2008), and justify violence (Hoffman, 2006; Sageman, 2008). Messaging articulates grievances, defines in‑group and out‑group boundaries (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Crenshaw, 1986; Hoffman, 2006), and promises honor, prestige, or spiritual reward to participants (Aasgard, 2017; King & Taylor, 2011). Within the field of political violence and psychology, two strands of research are especially relevant to this study: (1) jihadi framing and enemy construction and (2) the TTP’s ideological and media output. A third strand, linking digital propaganda to self‑efficacy, is reviewed with the Behavioral Skills component of the framework.

Framing and Enemy Construction

Comparative research on violent organizations finds that a coherent, “crisp” belief structure enhances appeal and helps justify violence against clearly defined enemies (Olzak, 2016). In terms of attracting support, media play a critical role in aligning individuals with terrorist groups’ political demands and motivating violent action (Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008; Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Religious and ethnic militants often frame conflict as stark binaries; righteous believers versus impure “others”, instrumentalizing narratives of threat and victimhood to motivate participation. The associated messaging is used to push certain frames, narratives and means of action (Baele et al., 2020; Friis, 2015). Studies of media produced by groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e-Labaik (Basit, 2020), show they emphasize national or sectarian divides to reinforce such binary frames (Magney, 2016).

Ttp Ideology and Media

Research on TTP highlights how the group’s messaging fuses Deobandi jihadism with local grievances to denounce Pakistan as an apostate pro‑Western state and to justify jihad against it (Feyyaz, 2016; Rana, 2008). Anti-democracy messaging portrays the political system as incompatible with Islamic principles and incapable of addressing Muslim grievances (Aggarwal, 2016; Brachman, 2009; Holt et al., 2015; Mousalli, 2012). Khan (2024) finds that in TTP discourse, democracy is framed as fundamentally corrupt, with institutions like the free press and civil society part of the illegitimate order.

Previous analyses of TTP publications and videos show recurring “Muslim vs. infidel/apostate” framing, the construction of enemy identities such as infidels, traitors, and Kharijites and use of historical and religious touchstones (Feyyaz, 2020; Khan, 2024; Zahid et al., 2020). Jihadi groups use concepts like tawhid and takfir to justify violence against those perceived as opposing Islamic governance, including Muslims sympathetic to democracy (Eikmeier, 2007; Manne, 2016; Mousalli, 2012). Recent work on TTP media finds the group portray themselves as righteous defenders of Islam, glamorize the jihadi lifestyle (Tahir, 2019), and deploy “master narratives” that link contemporary struggle to historic battles (Feyyaz, 2020).

Our study extends this body of TTP‑specific research by systematically coding a larger corpus of videos produced largely from 2016 and onward, a period marked by state operations such as Zarb‑e‑Azb and Radd‑ul‑Fasaad and by the group’s subsequent resurgence (e.g., Jadoon & Sayed, 2022). Unlike prior work that focuses primarily on narrative themes, this analysis uses the Information‑Motivation‑Behavioral Skills (IMB) framework to examine the informational content, motivational framing (especially anti‑democratic sentiment), and requisite behavioral skills embedded in TTP videos. This breaks into functional mechanisms through which the TTP messaging seeks to produce behavioral change.

Taken together, these strands of research establish the thematic and behavioral terrain of TTP media, identifying its ideological content and the frames that shape audience beliefs, but they stop short of integrating these dimensions within a unified behavioral framework. The IMB model fills this gap by providing a theoretical basis for how TTP messages inform, motivate, and instruct the audience to build behavioral capacity.

Theoretical Framework: the Imb Model

This study employs the IMB model as an analytical framework to explore how the TTP uses video content to radicalize and mobilize audiences. The model is supported empirically across the literature and applied to a range of areas related to behavioral modification, including voting (Glasford, 2008), drug use (Cooperman et al., 2015), and sexual behavior (John et al., 2017; Robinson, 2017). We use the model to categorize content into three domains: Information, which conveys knowledge and frames issues; Motivation, which appeals to personal attitudes and social norms; and Behavioral Skills, which are the “how-to” for active participation. The model specifies that Information and Motivation are necessary but insufficient conditions for behavioral change – individuals must also possess the skill and self-efficacy to act on what they know and feel (Fisher et al., 2003).

The IMB framework has been applied previously to Jihadi media, notably Lemieux et al. (2014) analyze Al-Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine showing the magazine extols violence and provides information on behavioral skills such as avoiding authorities and using weapons. Issues discussed by jihadi organizations may be foreign policy related, for example, concerning the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or relatively discrete such as the Burqa ban in France (Lemieux et al., 2014). Motivational appeals in Jihadi media contain language on injustice, obligation to the community and promise of divine reward. Jihadi materials highlight heroic qualities of jihadists and punishment for non-participants (Wilson & Lemieux, 2019).

Here we treat the IMB model as an organizing framework, rather than a rival to previous explanations for Islamist jihadi behavior, such as framing theory or social identity theory. The IMB is well suited to this case because it allows granular disaggregation of how TTP videos function across layers of communication. The model can accommodate existing psychological and social explanations; for example the information dimension fits well with framing theory, explaining how messages selectively emphasize certain aspects of reality to promote certain interpretations (Benford & Snow, 2000). Social identity theory and motivation fit together by explaining how group identities are constructed and maintained through in-group and out-group categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Together, framing and social identity theory help explain what TTP videos communicate and to whom.

Several models theorize radicalization as an individual pathway. Wiktorowicz (2005) identifies cognitive openings, religious seeking, and frame alignment as sequential stages through which individuals move toward extremism. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) similarly model radicalization as a pyramid of increasing extremity in beliefs and behavior. Borum (2004) traces a pathway from perceived grievance to attribution of blame to justification of violence. Grievance-based models (e.g., King & Taylor, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008) identify the affective conditions that predispose individuals toward radicalization but do not specify how media content cultivates those conditions or builds the perceived capacity to act on them. Or these models explain how individuals move toward radicalization (Borum, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), but they operate at the level of individual psychology; here we seek to identify the communicative mechanisms through which media consumption is meant to move audiences along that path.

In the IMB model, the Information domain encompasses the knowledge required to perform a behavior. In TTP videos, information is non-neutral – it is strategically framed to orient the audience toward the group’s worldview. Informational content can include accounts of the organization’s history, justifications for jihad, identification of allies and enemies or articulation of Islamic governance. Similar thematic distinctions appear in jihadi magazines such as Dabiq and Inspire (Vergani & Bliuc, 2018). Crucially, information in this context does not simply describe reality but constructs a particular version (Hoffman, 2006; Salem et al., 2008). In IMB terms, information includes not only facts but heuristics and implicit theories that guide decisions (Fisher & Fisher, 1992; Fisher et al., 2003); propaganda can supply heuristics that sort people into ingroup and outgroup and justify violence against the latter (Bandura, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The Motivation dimension addresses personal and collective drivers intended to move the audience to action. Beyond conveying information, propaganda seeks to affect the audience by invoking identity and social obligation. In Jihadi media this typically takes two forms: personal attitudes, which include appeals to religious duty, divine reward, and outrage at injustice; or social normative support, which creates the impression that community members endorse participation in jihad (Fisher & Fisher, 1992; Wilson & Lemieux, 2019). The Motivation dimension works through affective and social processes tied to identity and community, highlighting not just what is true but imposing social obligation. Personal motivation reflects attitudes toward the behavior and social motivation reflects perceived norms (Fisher & Fisher, 1992); norms describe what others do or prescribe what they approve (Cialdini et al., 1990), and people infer them from prototypical group members (Turner et al., 1987).

The distinction between the Information and Motivation dimensions is functional. The same content, such as narratives of injustice against Muslims or anti-democratic sentiment, operates informationally when it frames the truth of the world, such as the reality of wars in Afghanistan or Burma. At the same time, it acts motivationally by invoking moral outrage and implying a social or religious obligation to act. Information addresses the “facts of the case” according to TTP, or what the audience should understand about the actors and conduct that fill their world; Motivation addresses why the audience should care and what imperatives follow from this understanding.

The third and final component of IMB, Behavioral Skills address the individual’s capacity to perform the requisite behavior (Fisher & Fisher, 1992). Fisher et al. (2003) define Behavioral Skills as comprising both an individual’s perceived self-efficacy to perform key skills, and their objective ability to do so. In everyday contexts, this might connote the practical and cognitive steps required to vote or adopt a health behavior. In the context of terrorism, it refers to an individual’s perception of being able to contribute to the cause, whether through direct participation, monetary support, or tacit endorsement. In Jihadi media, the Behavioral Skills dimension is fulfilled through organizations’ portrayals of behavior desirable to the movement, including violence.

Our conception of Behavioral Skills draws on Bandura’s (1997) theory of self-efficacy to extend the IMB framework to jihadi activities. Bandura (1994) described self-efficacy as “people’s beliefs about their capabilities to produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect their lives” (p. 71). Bandura names vicarious experiences as one of the four sources of self-efficacy beliefs where successful modeling of a certain behavior enables change (Bandura, 1997). Simply put, as individuals witness competent models and make judgments about their own similarities, their perceived self-efficacy increases (Bandura, 1997).

Here we refer to self-efficacy through consumption of online propaganda as vicarious online efficacy transmission – we use “transmission” to distinguish this process from general digital efficacy, which describes comfort with digital technologies. This emphasizes the cognitive mechanism by which media shapes beliefs about one’s abilities to act (Bandura, 2001b; Schlegel, 2020). We argue that vicarious online efficacy is the process of modeling in social and conventional media that helps individuals strengthen their beliefs in being able to participate in an activity due to familiarity with its mechanics, process, or perceived simplicity (Hu et al., 2024). Individuals seek to emulate models which they observe, as Schlegel (2020) argues, “online-propaganda is aimed at increasing perceived self-efficacy of its consumers through social persuasion as well as vicarious or modelling experiences” (p. 223). Studies on the effect of online engagement have produced evidence on behavioral shifts (e.g., Holt et al., 2017). Research has long shown that propaganda and political communication can shape beliefs about one’s capacity to act (Campbell et al., 1954), and digital media can lower the cost of participation (Bode, 2017; Boulianne & Theocharis, 2020; Oser et al., 2022).

Studies of digital politics and extremist media argue that repeated exposure to instructional content and modeled behavior can normalize violence (Johnston, 2022; Razzaque, 2008), lower perceived barriers to engagement, and provide “how‑to” knowledge for would‑be participants (e.g., Hofstetter et al., 2001; Mehran & Lemieux, 2023; Oser et al., 2022). O’Shaughnessy and Baines (2009) write that in some organizations observance of violence is an initiation act. Comparative work on jihadi messaging and communications across Al‑Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban, and TTP notes detailed guidance on operational security, travel, and participation as part of efforts to build audience competence and confidence (Mehran & Lemieux, 2023).

The TTP’s Behavioral Skills content includes the depiction of military operations, weapons use, and governance activities. Theorizing behavioral skills as vicarious online efficacy, the IMB model captures a wider audience that may consume jihadi content and make differing judgments about their ability to effect change – from jihobbyists to active TTP members (Brachman, 2009; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2017; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Table 1 showcases the main dimensions of IMB and the psychological function they are theorized to play.

Table 1
Elements and Operationalization of the IMB Model

Method

Research Design

This study uses qualitative content analysis of TTP videos to examine how the group uses information, motivation, and behavioral skills in line with the IMB framework (Krippendorff, 2004). The design is a single‑case, cross‑sectional study of TTP videos, treating clips within each video as the unit of analysis and including examination of language, visuals, and narrative.

Case Selection and Significance

The TTP functions as a non‑state insurgent actor that relies on asymmetric warfare, cross‑border sanctuary, and ideological outreach to sustain its campaign (Craig & Khan, 2014; Sayed, 2021). The group therefore faces a distinctive ideological challenge: it must build legitimacy against a Muslim democratic state. This makes the TTP an illustrative case for the IMB: its videos must tell viewers why fellow Muslims are considered enemies and show how and why to act against them, and its operational footage makes the requisite behavioral skills palpable.

Our study concentrates on video, which integrates speech, visuals, and symbolic action in a way that is central to the group’s outreach and is especially conducive to IMB analysis. While text-based propaganda such as Inspire and Dabiq employ IMB components through written content and images (Lemieux et al., 2014), videos uniquely integrate spoken narrative, emotional imagery, and visual modeling of behavior, offering rich material for examining how the IMB dimensions interact in a multi-modal setting (Barr & Herfroy-Mischler, 2018; Salem et al., 2008).

This study adopts an interpretivist epistemological position, treating TTP videos as socially constructed content whose meanings are ideologically embedded and context dependent. Analytic memos were used throughout the coding process to document interpretive decisions and manage potential researcher bias.

Data Collection

Our dataset for this analysis features 44 videos published by the TTP. The released videos are dated between 2009 and 2020. This period spans the group’s early peak, its weakening under military operations from 2014 (Zarb-e-Azb, Radd-ul-Fasaad), and reorganization under Noor Wali Mehsud from 2018, capturing ideological and strategic shifts. Appendix 1 lists the full video dataset as well as their runtimes, which ranged from 23 seconds (video of an IED attack) to around 58 minutes. Two videos had no associated date, and three carried a month and year only. The two undated videos were included based on the Umar Media brand, leaders featured, and events discussed.

The corpus was drawn from the Mobilizing Media archive, which sought to collect as many TTP-linked videos as possible from open-source platforms including Telegram and Jihadology.net. From the 47 videos screened from the archives, we included 44 videos that were, 1) produced by the TTP or the TTP-related media cell Umar Media, 2) released between 2007 (formation of the TTP) and 2020 and 3) contained messaging, appeals and imagery geared toward the Pakistani audience, such as references to the Pakistani military and jihadi operations in Pakistan, the politics of Pakistan’s creation and the role of the TTP. These criteria were applied by the first author, a native Urdu speaker.

Two videos produced by the Islamic Caliphate of Khorasan were excluded, the first “Jasoos (Spy) Itihad-Mujahid-Khurasan (Urdu)” depicts activities in Pakistan and second “In Memory of Hakim-allah Mehsud – Khorasan Islamic Emirate” commemorates the life of the ex-TTP emir. Lastly, a video introducing the Emir, “10-2009_TTP Chief Hakimullah Mehsud” produced by the Al-Qaeda affiliate As-Sahab was removed.

Translation Procedure

Translation and transcription into English was a three-stage process. Videos were first watched in their entirety by the translator (first author) to familiarize themselves with the group’s content, style and recurring terminology. In the second step, dialogue and on-screen text were transcribed in Urdu. At the third stage, transcriptions were translated into English and entered in NVivo alongside the relevant clip timestamps. The TTP primarily employs Urdu and when Pashto was spoken, it was typically accompanied by Umar Media’s own Urdu subtitles. Sections were reviewed and revised iteratively to maintain consistency in phrasing across the corpus.

Positionality and Reflexivity

The first author, who translated the material and carried out the initial coding, is a native Urdu speaker (with prior translation experience) and Pakistani national familiar with the history of the TTP. Familiarity with the background and political context aided in interpretation of the terms, metaphors, and references used by the TTP. The first author is unaffiliated with the TTP and sees them as a non-state rebel group vying for control of contested territories in the Indian sub-continent. The author is familiar with the TTP’s claims, Pakistan’s official stance on the group, and the larger ecosystem of Islamist jihadi organizations.

This background guided translation and coding decisions. Kufr was retained in transliteration as a category code, murtad was rendered as “Apostate”, and these codes were categorized under the Ingroup/Outgroup parent code under Information. While munafiq (hypocrite) is frequently used by TTP to refer to the Pakistani state its use was primarily polemic, so mentions of Pakistan under the Information category are coded as “Near Enemy” rather than under “Hypocrisy of Democratic States” which is a code under “Anti-democracy”. The codebook defined Prescribed and Proscribed Conduct broadly, as ideas or conduct the TTP generally endorses or condemns. The first author, reading into TTP framing closely, applied them to operations and martyrdom as well as to general endorsement; the second coder applied them more narrowly. This became a main source of disagreement between coders (see Coding Validity and Reliability).

The second coder is not a native Urdu speaker and worked from English translations. The coder has a background in film studies and is earning a doctorate in communications, which enabled them to serve as a check on the interpretations of the first coder. To limit over-interpretation we kept memos, discussed codes and disagreements in meetings and generally coded conservatively, in addition to creating decision rules for applying codes.

Coding Process

The codebook was built on previous applications of the IMB model to jihadi media (Lemieux et al., 2014; Mehran & Lemieux, 2023). Initial codes identifying TTP ideology and motivation were derived from themes identified in prior research on jihadi propaganda (Feyyaz, 2020; Rashid, 2002). For the original submission of this article, these deductive codes were applied to a randomly selected subset of ten videos, after which additional codes emerged inductively, capturing group-specific narratives and visual motifs (Thomas, 2006). Based on the initial coding round, the codebook was revised; codes were added, consolidated, or dropped, and the refined scheme was then applied to the remainder of the corpus. Videos from the first round were recoded to maintain consistency. The codebook was refined again for this revision through the two calibration rounds described under Coding Validity and Reliability. For the 14 calibration videos, the first author’s coding was revised after discussion; the remaining 30 were coded with the finalized codebook.

Coding was conducted manually in NVivo following completion of translations. Individual codes were mapped to parent categories corresponding to the three IMB dimensions – for example, Anti-democracy and Ideology under Information; Personal Attitudes and Social Normative Support under Motivation; and Deconstruction and Normalizing Violence under Behavioral Skills (see Appendix 2 for the full codebook). Each video was coded for specific IMB elements at the clip level, with clips defined as short segments delimited by natural transitions in scene, speaker, or topic. Counts report the number of clips in which each code was present in the first author’s final coding across 44 videos. The counts indicate thematic prevalence not statistical estimation.

Information was coded when the clip described actors, events, or conditions, Motivation was coded when it addressed the audience (men or Muslim community), using emotional language and highlighting obligations. Where a clip served both functions, both codes were applied. For anti-democratic content, “Flaws in Democracy” and “Hypocrisy of Democratic States” were coded as Information when they pointed to ideological critiques or behavior that threatened liberal democratic norms. “Opposition Toward Democracy” was classified under Motivation, when a speaker expressed personal hostility toward democracy or pleaded for the Muslim community to reject it, claiming it is unsuitable. “Flaws in Democracy” was coded when a clip set out an argument about democracy’s shortcomings without that appeal.

Saturation of codes was sought at two levels, clips in videos and the full corpus. At the clip level, each video was viewed multiple times to ensure consistent and complete coding of themes within that video. At the corpus level, saturation was assessed iteratively, during the first author’s original coding of the corpus after approximately thirty videos had been coded, three additional videos were reviewed specifically for new thematic content. When no new codes emerged across these subsequent viewings, saturation was considered achieved.

Coding Validity and Reliability

Reliability was established in three stages. For the original manuscript submission, a second coder independently coded nine videos with the original codebook, and agreement was low (Information κ = .18, Motivation κ = .22, Behavioral Skills κ = .53). The coders then discussed every disagreement, wrote decision rules, including rules for clips where informational and motivational functions overlap, and renamed two codes without changing their content (Weapons Display and Use; Support for Martyrdom). In two calibration rounds, both coders first separately coded the same nine videos and then coded another five videos with the revised codebook. After each round, they compared their coding clip by clip, discussed disagreements and refined the decision rules until the codebook was finalized. Agreement on the five new videos was above the .60 benchmark (Information κ = .76, Motivation κ = .72, Behavioral Skills κ = .87), but because these rounds were used to revise the codebook, reliability is estimated on the final round only.

The remaining 30 videos (428 clips) were then coded independently by both coders with the finalized codebook (the first author in NVivo, the second coder in a spreadsheet), using the same clip boundaries. These 30 videos form the reliability sample. The 14 calibration videos were also coded by both coders, but during codebook development and with disagreements discussed after each round, so they are not used to estimate reliability. Each clip was coded for the presence or absence of each of the 44 codes (Appendix 2). Agreement is reported as Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960), interpreted with Landis and Koch’s (1977) benchmarks, together with percent agreement and two prevalence-adjusted coefficients, PABAK (Byrt et al., 1993) and Gwet’s AC1 (Gwet, 2008). For parent nodes and IMB dimensions, a clip counted as coded if any code beneath the node was applied.

Across all 18,832 code-by-clip decisions, agreement was 94.2% (κ = .72; PABAK = .88; AC1 = .93). At the dimension level, κ was .78 for Behavioral Skills and .70 for Motivation (Table 2). However, Information fell below the .60 benchmark (κ = .57; 86.4% agreement; PABAK = .73; AC1 = .80). Two features of the data account for most of this: 1) Information is present in more than 80% of clips, which depresses kappa; agreement on the individual Information codes was κ = .72 (93.6%); 2) the shortfall is concentrated in the Ideology node (κ = .45), where the broad definition of Prescribed and Proscribed Conduct allowed different interpretations. The first author applied them more often, as general endorsement or condemnation, including in clips also coded for organization activity, martyrdom, and justifications (final-round clips, Prescribed: 218 vs. 171; Proscribed: 82 vs. 61). The other Information nodes reached κ = .69 to .80. A further systematic difference was that the second coder coded any mention of the Pakistani military or security forces as Near Enemy, whereas the first author did so only when they were explicitly framed as enemies (198 vs. 165 clips). The second coder also coded Friends more broadly, including references to the TTP’s own members (111 vs. 73 clips in the final round). The coders met after the final round to discuss these disagreements; all coefficients reported here were computed on the independent coding before that discussion. Thirty-five of the 44 codes reached κ ≥ .60. The nine that did not were Prescribed Conduct and Ideas (κ = .49), Proscribed Conduct and Ideas (κ = .42), Target Institutions (κ = .46), Exemplars (κ = .58), and five rare codes with agreement of at least 97% (Abolishing Democracy, Allies, Making Explosives, Support for Traditional Government and Service Provision, for which κ is undefined because neither coder applied it in the final round; Appendix 2). We qualify claims that depend on the Information dimension accordingly (see Limitations). The single-coder code–recode check reported in the original submission was not repeated; the 30 final-round videos were instead double-coded independently.

Table 2
Intercoder Agreement by IMB Dimension, Final Round (30 Videos, 428 Clips)

Note. Agreement statistics compare the two coders’ independent coding of the 30 videos (428 clips) coded after the codebook was finalized, before the coders discussed disagreements; a clip counts as coded for a dimension if any code beneath it was applied. Code-by-clip agreement within each dimension was κ = .72 for Information (93.6%), .72 for Motivation (94.7%) and .73 for Behavioral Skills (94.7%). κ = Cohen’s kappa; PABAK = prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (Byrt et al., 1993); AC1 = Gwet’s AC1 (Gwet, 2008). Code-level coefficients are reported in Appendix 2.

Disagreements in the final round were resolved through consensus: all agreement statistics reported here were computed on the two coders’ independent coding before meeting and discussion.

Ethical Considerations

All videos in the corpus were obtained through research/archival sources, and their storage was carefully managed under the Mobilizing Media project in a secure Dropbox. They were kept solely for academic analyses. The study complied with all institutional research guidelines at the authors’ institution. As the study involved analysis of publicly available archival media rather than human subjects, IRB review was not required. TTP leaders and other public figures are named as they appear in the videos; the names and likenesses of victims and other private individuals are withheld. Violence is described in words, scenes are summarized, and attention is directed to messaging rather than to graphic imagery. Given the graphic nature of these videos, the researchers adopted strategies to manage distress, including limiting exposure and keeping memos throughout coding.

Results

Overview of Thematic Patterns

The results of the analysis here largely mirror patterns identified in research on other jihadi organizations: conceptions of near and far enemies, claims about the incompatibility of Islam and democracy, and a sustained emphasis on jihad recur throughout the corpus. At the same time, the videos reveal distinctive ways in which TTP links these themes to behavioral‑skills cues that model how to participate in jihad. The discussion that follows proceeds in three parts, corresponding to the information, motivation, and behavioral‑skills components of the IMB framework. In 37 of the 44 videos (84.1%) and 177 of the 533 (33.2%) coded clips, codes from all three IMB dimensions were present.

Broadly, the TTP’s video messaging reinforces jihadi ideology stating their goals in Pakistan and using various frames to justify their actions. A large part of TTP videos is dedicated to articulating its political vision, identifying the enemies of the organization, reinforcing the ingroup/outgroup dynamics and publicizing TTP activities. As expected, the TTP presents itself as an authentically Muslim group fighting for Islamic governance in Pakistan. The videos frequently use Istishadi, Mujahideen, and Fidayeen to refer to members of TTP. The TTP introduces narratives designed to problematize current issues facing the Muslim communities around the world. The group goes to great lengths to show Pakistan as the aggressor while depicting a softer image of themselves. Videos also include false conspiratorial elements, such as portraying the 2014 Army Public School Peshawar Massacre as being a scheme deployed by the Pakistani security forces to discredit the TTP.

Figure 1
Code Frequencies by IMB Dimension and Parent Node

Figure 1 shows the frequency of each code, grouped by IMB dimension and parent node. Information codes are most frequent, led by Prescribed Conduct and Ideas, and Organization Activity; Motivation is dominated by Injustice against the Muslim Community and Exemplars, whereas Weapons Display and Use is the most common Behavioral Skills code, appearing as a symbol and narrative device. The corpus ranges from long-form narrated features on Pakistani politics and foreign policy (e.g., “The New Policy of Trump and the Absurdness of Pakistan”) to appeals to specific audiences such as madrassa students (“Message to Madaris Tulaba”) or Balochi separatists (“Healing Balochistan”). Videos also prominently feature polemic against Pakistan, training-camp footage and short clips of attacks.

Information

The TTP’s informational content centers on its political messaging; its version of Islamic governance for Pakistan, how to get there, and who to rely on. In addition to its ideological outlook, the TTP also provides information regarding the organization’s activity. The form and function of content varies by video, there are frequent updates by the leadership on decision making justifications for activities.

Table 3
Information: Leading Themes, Codebook Descriptions and Example Excerpts

The ideology code broadly captures data on TTP’s thought along four sub-codes. Two: “Islamic Governance” – describe the ontology and epistemology of the TTP’s “authentic” Islamic government; and “Justification for Goals” capture narrative regarding the justification for the conduct of the TTP. The two remaining codes; Prescribed Conduct & Ideas, and Proscribed Conduct & Ideas highlight behaviors deemed acceptable or unacceptable, identified endorsed or condemned through ideological imperatives. In “Don’t Wait Don’t Stop” (02-09-2013) a speaker places these in light of the TTP’s goals:

“Our objective is this – that on Allah’s Earth, on Allah’s creation, Allah’s law be enforced, to achieve this, sacrificing ourselves is our motive, nothing else, we don’t want a chair (office), neither votes nor money. We just want the creation of Allah to be successful, and connected to Allah, so that you can achieve peace at the end of the world. The peace which the government imagines, are lies, peace… whenever it comes, comes from Shariat. Full shariat and its implementation is through Jihad.”

The TTP problematizes Pakistan’s deviance from authentic Islam and adherence to democracy. Anti-democracy sentiment is a mainstay of TTP videos, and these codes appeared in 123 of the 533 (23.1%) clips across 31 of the 44 videos. Ideological arguments inspired by Islamic thought against democracy are present but attempts to discredit democracy are more common. Videos that mention the United States, or the West, often also attack democracy. Democratic politics functions as a reliable and continuous foil for Islamic governance in the TTP’s videos. Democratic politics is portrayed as degenerative, for example, in “The Last Chapter” the TTP focus on the rent-seeking behavior of the news media and frame corruption as a problem of democracy.

“Hypocrisy of Democratic States” and“Flaws in Democracy” codes are two important sub-codes within the Anti-democracy node. The former shows hypocritical behavior by democracies such as rights violations, while the latter contains narratives of the TTP on why democracy is incompatible with Islam. Across the corpus, “Hypocrisy of Democratic States” appears in 66 clips across 16 videos versus 14 clips for “Flaws in Democracy”, which reveals greater emphasis on relying on democratic governance as a foil. The TTP reject majority rule as shown in “Is there a fixed path to implement Islam?” (07-2018)

“…Shariat of Allah has primacy; only then will it be called an Islamic system. For its establishment, the standard is that it draws from the laws of Arabs…For example, majority opinion, voting, and public opinion – the democratic way has only these things. To give a Shariah command the status of law, the standard of the majority is illegal. Because all Shariah is law, will be law, and was law. To give the legal status conditional on the assent of the public, the assent of representatives, then that is not Allah’s way”.

This clip was classified under “Flaws in Democracy” as it features an ideological argument based on the completeness of Islam. The concept of “man-made” laws is painted in opposition to the divine law for which Islam is a vehicle. This ideological insistence on the pure implementation of Islamic governance has significant overlap with portrayal of the Pakistani political system as flawed and unsustainable.

In the video “Then Wait 4”, a newspaper clipping is shown which reads “Guantanamo in Pakistan.” This is followed by what appear to be several clips of Pakistani state security forces torturing and abusing individuals. In doing so Pakistan is portrayed as hypocritical by implying a disregard for the due process of law and civil liberties, while pursuing the agenda of the Far enemy in suppressing the TTP who strive for authentic Islamic governance. The assertion here is that due to the actions of Western states and their apostate allies the Muslim community is under attack. Therefore, “Hypocrisy of Democratic States” is a code that reveals a sophisticated use of Information on the part of the TTP. This is an example of a rhetorical technique intended to discredit democracy as a viable system for the Muslim community by showcasing ill-treatment of Muslims. This is particularly effective for Muslim audiences as hypocrisy (munafiqat) is a reviled notion in Islam. Supporters of democracy therefore are subtextually implied to be enemies of Islam.

The “Anti-democracy” node also includes three codes for rejection of liberal values: “Anti-Pluralism”, “Anti-Press” and “Anti-Egalitarianism”. In TTP videos, these are framed as undesirable ideas or behaviors as far as construction of their Islamic ideal goes. Anti-Pluralism was the most frequent (51 clips across 25 videos) and co-occurred with Kufr in 39 clips and Apostates in 24, typically in messages on Quranic injunctions against non-believers. Explicit references to Christians (12) and Jews (10) were scriptural or rhetorical, for example the video “The New Policy of Trump and the Absurdness of Pakistan” cites a Quranic verse warning believers not to take Jews and Christians as friends, clearly intended to reinforce ingroups and outgroups. Anti-Press clips (10 across 6 videos) cast the media as deceitful and aligned against Muslims; Anti-Egalitarianism appeared in only four clips across three videos. This is consistent with the point that TTP’s critique of democracy targets conduct and is relatively thin on philosophical arguments against democracy.

Al-Qaeda’s influence on the TTP’s ideology is visible here: Al-Qaeda popularized the concepts of “the enemy that is near” and “the enemy that is afar” (Eikmeier, 2007; Post, 2007). In videos such as ‘The New Policy of Trump and the Absurdness of Pakistan’, and across the corpus, the concepts of the ‘near’ and ‘far’ enemy are used to identify targets. The near enemy is implied to be the Pakistani government, security establishment, and state; whereas the far enemy is implied to be not just the United States but other groups that threaten the Muslim community across the world. The exact language varies considerably, but similar construction is used to refer to both state institutions and individuals. The Near/Far enemy concept is intended to provide information to the audience but also motivate the audience and is often found concurrently with the “Injustice Against the Muslim Community” code.

The TTP create several categories of allies and enemies while identifying “Ingroups and Outgroups” within TTP videos in terms of Islam versus the West or the TTP (or Mujahideen) versus Pakistan. By identifying outgroups and situations that accentuate group-based identity, the TTP reinforce the concept that Muslims worldwide are under attack – and across videos the TTP can introduce and reinforce the narrative of Islam vs. the rest. These groupings include classifying the Pakistani state and military as “Apostates”, who are liable to be killed; this serves the rhetorical and ideological function of separating them from “true Muslims”. Accompanying motivational appeals often target “real men” to do their duty by participating in Jihad or assisting the TTP. These appeals are accompanied by moralistic use of language, framing of political problems as religious issues, and serve as justification for goals of the TTP. This is an example of the Information and Motivation dimensions complementing each other through framing of group dynamics and creating obligation for action.

Motivation

Motivating individuals for jihad is a major theme, its construction revolves around identity and duty to the broader Muslim community. To accomplish this the TTP utilize various frames, including “Injustice Against the Muslim Community”, which is a particularly effective narrative device in invoking moral outrage. A corresponding motivational element is the idea of duty as a Muslim and subsequent divine reward, which showcases appeals to both individual attitudes and social support. The motivational dimension here works alongside the Informational aspects of the videos to shed light on instances of suffering and motivate individuals to fight for justice.

Another notable trend is the mention of various TTP leaders. This not only gives the audience information on the history of the organization and lends it authenticity, but also sets the leaders up as “Exemplars” to emulate and as a source of motivation; the title of the video series “Champions of the Nation” reflects the same aim. For the TTP, abolishing democracy in Pakistan is a stepping stone toward complete Islamic governance throughout the world. The following quote from “Champions of the Nation 2” (02-14-2018) shows this anti-democratic stance:

“The great jihadi platform of the 15th century [AH] Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, which for 14-15 years has been striving in its purpose against idolator country Pakistan… And reminded the community this forgotten lesson that to destroy any idolator and to enact the law of Allah, the only way is jihadi politics, not democratic politics. Because the objective of jihadi politics is the regime of Shariat and the end of humanity. And the objective of democratic politics is treason, chasing station and material gain.”

Table 4
Motivation: Leading Themes, Codebook Descriptions and Example Excerpts

Several video segments cite ongoing conflicts in Burma and Syria. In one video (02-04-2018 “Then Wait 4”) the TTP portray the global Muslim community as victims, swearing revenge against those responsible, focusing on reinforcing the in-group-out-group dynamic and also motivating through outrage based on disgust at betrayal.

Interplay between information and motivation forms the crux of TTP’s messaging in framing their jihadi political outlook. Videos have both elements occur simultaneously or closely throughout. Appealing to this sense of deprivation is common in recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations as noted in the literature, and vengeance against those who commit injustice is a particularly powerful motivator (Borum, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991).

“Social Normative Support” captures narrative appeals regarding social standing and approval within the Muslim Community. By invoking concepts from Islamic thought and utilizing relational language these codes relay a sense of responsibility and duty. “Exemplars” mentions individuals with positive qualities (honor, strength, wit) to emulate. Eulogy-style videos which commemorate and glorify the actions of jihadists are also common. Such videos provide a brief biography of a TTP member – their origin, subsequent involvement in jihadi activity and flowery descriptions of their heroic demise. The TTP’s “Champions of the Nation” series frequently features these, which provide narratives on individuals’ jihadi activity and portray them as role models. In “Then Wait 4” (02-04-2018), a young man speaks to the audience, construing Islam as under attack and calling for action from his community: “Unbelievers for their self-serving systems sacrifice everything, and you can’t even sacrifice your wife, children, and loved ones to protect the divine law of Allah? What kind of Muslim are you after all? Oh, negligent young men…”

TTP videos use sophisticated narrative techniques to mobilize the audience and have them identify with their message. The sub-codes “Endorsement”, “Exemplars” and “Jihad” provide a picture of the collective identity through narrative (Polletta, 1998). Young men who speak of their love of jihad and their service to Allah frequently appear in videos to help the audience identify with the subject. The man in “Then Wait 4” quoted above is one example, a typical technique in such videos is for the cameraman to ask the subject for a message addressing Muslims; the subjects almost always implore the audience to join Jihad or support the Mujahideen. In another technique, the young men in TTP videos often play up the jihadi lifestyle as radical, honorable, and adventurous. The “Endorsement” code captures TTP members or supporters voicing support for the group on screen, which creates the impression of the TTP as having broad support in the community. Appeals like this invite viewers to compare themselves with fighters held up as good Muslims and to identify with speakers who resemble them (Cohen, 2006). A particularly striking example of Information and Motivation interacting is the video “Message to the Pakistani Army,” in which children dramatize plays to re-enact Pakistan’s misconduct against the Muslim community.

Under the “Jihad” sub-code, the TTP’s construction of Jihad is a simplified representation of the concept in Islamic thought, Jihad is constructed as a physical activity as opposed to an internal struggle. Jihad also carries a revolutionary connotation in TTP media – being divorced from regular politics and the only possible vehicle for bringing about significant change. These framings tie into identity and community, both of which offer strong psychosocial imperatives to join groups (e.g., Borum, 2004).

“Personal Attitudes” are often invoked through religious duty and reward. The TTP construes jihad as a religious duty and article of faith. In “Until There is No More Discord 3” a speaker describes divine reward for Jihad: “When you conduct Jihad, then for this Allah will forgive your sins… Surah Al-Saf verse 12 and, will allow you into gardens where streams flow. Streams of four types; alcohol (sharab), water, honey and milk, this is awesome success.” The language preceding the quote speaks of divine reward for those who are “true” Muslims and tacitly connects being a true Muslim to engaging in Jihad. It is also an example of “Religious Reward” and “Religious Duty” codes, which are two aspects of Personal Attitudes, in an appeal for Jihad where entry to heaven is guaranteed for martyrs.

There are also Motivational appeals which connect conspiratorial elements to western and democratic states. The TTP view Western support and Muslim suffering as propagating the western hegemony and propping up the apostate government in Pakistan.

“Those of you who have sold your country to strangers. Those of you who sold your brothers and sisters for the greed of dollars. Quiet bystanders of crimes against humanity on Muslims in Burma. You who shake hands with those who launched a severe attack on Syria. Those of you who had a role in the massacre of Palestinians. Those of you who assisted America in bombarding Afghanistan… Wait for your turn.” (“Then Wait 4,” 02-04-2018)

Behavioral Skills

Three broad aspects of the videos touch on behavioral skills: normalization of violence, deconstruction of the state and conduct in jihad. “Deconstruction” is disambiguation of parts of the state – reducing the nebulous concept of Pakistan down to individual agents, institutions, and buildings (e.g., Venkatesh et al., 2020). Another notable code is “Alternatives to Expertise”, the depiction of TTP members as individuals possessing providence and achieving success despite overwhelming odds. This is often played up by narrators when describing the success of TTP paramilitary operations.

Table 5
Behavioral Skills: Leading Themes, Codebook Descriptions and Example Excerpts

The Behavioral Skills dimension is particularly relevant to how the TTP orient their audience toward what the jihadi struggle entails and inculcate involvement in the movement. The process resembles radicalization, in which people gradually become more accepting of the requisite behavior. Behavioral Skills are the how-to of “Jihad”; the analyzed videos show a tendency for the TTP to focus on skills related to militancy and combat, the parent code “Governance” captured behaviors related to Islamic governance. In “Champions of the Nation 2 02/14/2018”, the narrator names an officer as a target: “Peshawar’s S.P. [name] thought himself the contractor of the idol regime in Peshawar. Every vein in his body contained hatred for Islam. This is why he spent his life combatting the Taliban…This is why he was trapped easily.” This is an example of the TTP utilizing “Deconstruction” to actualize the Pakistani state by pointing to its representatives or other tangible elements. We found that the TTP focused on targeting state representatives and institutions by naming the targets and their position in the regime. By repeatedly showing attacks on state representatives and institutions the TTP model how to fight the Pakistani state and construct their goals as achievable. Additionally, the TTP depict the Pakistani state as weak, corrupt, and incompetent whereas the Mujahideen are brave, resilient, and capable. For example, one video sarcastically praises a Pakistani soldier as, “member of the unholy army, successful in taking his LMG and running away”.

“Normalizing Violence” is another theme that was identified concerning Behavioral Skills – this comprises the frequent showcase and varied use of weapons, explosives, and graphic imagery in their videos. Because efficacy can be built through vicarious experiences as well as through persuasion (Bandura, 2001a), repeated footage of the TTP accomplishing certain tasks may raise viewers’ perceived efficacy. The TTP broadcasts training montages and weapons use in their videos to glorify their struggle and to portray the use of weapons as regular day-to-day activities. The TTP also regularly show images of individuals injured or killed in their bombings or shootings. There are several instances of killing in the overall corpus which may attract a certain violent disposition. We posit that such imagery is a self-selecting device that weeds out those who may not be supportive or willing to engage in the military operations of the TTP. But over time this may normalize violence for those who identify with the mission of the TTP. This is consistent with the literature where exposure to violent media over time aligns individuals seeking acceptance to the political demands of the group; going as far as the adoption of violence as a tactic (e.g., Lindekilde, 2016; Wiktorowicz, 2005).

The violence serves another function in showcasing the performance of authentic Islam – “Conduct in Jihad” and “Governance”. For example, the TTP showcase beheadings of Pakistani soldiers and spies to reinforce their image as an authentically Islamic rebel group that abides by the Islamic punishments (“Darrah Adam Khel,” 01-11-2011). Darrah Adam Khel is a region within Pakistan where the Pakistani military regularly conducted operations in the past. In the eponymous video, TTP members attack Pakistani military outposts. Once the fortifications are overrun, the soldiers inside are executed by beheading, and the TTP members collect spoils of war. In ‘Don’t Wait Don’t Stop’ (02-09-2013), a speaker states the group’s objective,

“…unity (Etihad) and this cooperation, would not be cooperation in name but true cooperation…We made this decision for defense so that we can defend ourselves from the kufar and by Allah’s grace the result of this cooperation will be the implementation of Shariah in Pakistan…”

Governance is also modeled, for example in “Services Provided in South Waziristan” (09-21-2017) the TTP are shown providing education and clothing to children, accompanied by scriptural citations on service to the community. In other videos, the TTP emphasizes the importance of “Cooperation and Goodwill” to achieve political goals, this is again framed as Muslims versus the rest, where cooperation among Mujahideen and the greater Muslim community is the key to victory. The TTP conceives of their movement as a unifying force and representing a broad section of the Muslim community standing against Kufr. Scripture reinforces this; “Don’t Wait Don’t Stop” (02-09-2013) opens with the Urdu and Arabic scripts reading – “Indeed Allah makes friends with those who cooperate in Jihad and who are a wall (for Allah)”. By presenting the organization as a cooperative body, the TTP offers itself as a platform from which to wage Jihad.

Discussion

Information

This study confirms and extends prior findings on TTP and jihadi messaging on separating true Muslims from Kharijites and apostates. Consistent with Khan (2024) and Feyyaz (2020), we find that TTP videos employ Muslim versus apostate framing extensively, connecting apostasy directly to democratic governance and Western political influence. The prevalence of historical grievance narratives documenting Muslim mistreatment across Afghanistan, Burma, Syria, and Palestine corroborates earlier accounts of TTP’s victimhood framing while demonstrating its systematic application across a larger and more recent corpus than previously analyzed. We also find consistent deployment of Al-Qaeda’s near/far enemy doctrine (Eikmeier, 2007), with the Pakistani state cast as the near enemy and Western powers as the far enemy, a distinction that structures much of the group’s content. The critique of democracy is aimed less at democratic doctrine, than at the conduct of Pakistan and other states . Across the corpus, “Hypocrisy of Democratic States” appears in 66 clips across 16 videos, whereas Flaws in Democracy appears in 14 clips.

What the IMB framework adds beyond prior narrative analyses is a functional account of information provision. Rather than simply describing the world, TTP’s informational content serves to construct a worldview in which the audience’s circumstances are the direct result of apostasy and Western interference, and in which the only meaningful response is jihad. This aligns with prior research on cognitive openings to radicalization, which reframe personal and collective grievances to motivate behavioral change (Wiktorowicz, 2005). Information, in the IMB framework prepares the audience for the motivational and behavioral appeals.

Motivation

Our findings confirm radicalization pathways identified in prior literature, showing that TTP videos deploy grievance, identity, and obligation consistent with established accounts of how extremist organizations motivate participation (Borum, 2004; King & Taylor, 2011). The motivational dimension of TTP’s messaging operates primarily through two channels: personal attitudes, invoking religious duty and divine reward; and social normative support, constructing the impression that participation in jihad reflects the will of the broader community.

The TTP’s distinctive ideological challenge of motivating violence against a Muslim democratic state is reflected in those appeals. Because the group cannot rely on a simple Muslim versus non-Muslim binary, motivational content must do additional work. Pakistani security forces and government officials are framed as traitors, enemies of the community, and instruments of the West. This framing, illustrated by the naming of specific targets such as police commander S.P. [Name] as a lackey of the idolator regime, personalizes the enemy and makes the obligation to act concrete. The IMB motivation component captures this functional move, from group identification to behavioral prescription in a way that social identity theory alone does not. In terms of social identity theory, the videos work through categorization (Ingroups and Outgroups, Apostates, Kufr), reinforcing identification with the ingroup (the “true Muslim” modeled by Exemplars and Endorsement), and group distinction (Anti-Democracy, Hypocrisy of Democratic States).

Eulogy videos and the Exemplars code draw a parallel to Bandura’s (1997) account of vicarious modeling. By presenting fallen fighters as heroic and worthy of emulation, these videos inspire and demonstrate what a good Muslim looks like in the context of jihad, establishing normative standards that function as both motivational and behavioral cues. This blending of motivational and behavioral content reflects the multifunctional nature of TTP videos.

Behavioral Skills

Behavioral skills content in the corpus is about perceived capacity and self-efficacy. The “Alternatives to Expertise” code offers one stark illustration: narrators present resolve and divine favor as substitutes for training and capacity. Among the four sources of self-efficacy identified by Bandura (1997), media content cannot supply mastery, but it can supply vicarious experience through repeated illustrations of successful models, social persuasion that shows success in fighting the state as achievable and reduce aversion to violence through repeated exposure. This illustrates the psychological mechanism of vicarious online efficacy transmission. The process at hand may not predict action, but conceivably narrows the perceived distance between the audience member and a participant, consistent with the continuum of engagement in jihad as theorized by other authors (e.g., Brachman, 2009).

Critically, Behavioral Skills content is oriented toward organizational participation. Only one video, “Healing Balochistan” (03-29-2018), shows how to make explosives; there is no audio instruction, but the visuals show the preparation of explosives, ingredients and tripwire traps. Unlike Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, whose Inspire magazine encouraged lone-actor attacks and explained how to carry them out (Lemieux et al., 2014), the TTP’s videos do not call on viewers to act alone. This is consistent with the view that organizations are selective in their violence so as not to invite needless state scrutiny (Kydd & Walter, 2006; McCormick, 2003), and with Byman’s (2017) observation that groups tend to encourage lone actors when they are too weak to mount organized attacks; to the contrary, the TTP continued to claim organized attacks throughout the period covered by the corpus. TTP videos therefore appear designed to recruit members to the organization rather than inspire independent violence.

Governance content is an undertheorized dimension of behavioral skills when it comes to jihadi organizations. Scenes of service provision (TTP members distributing clothing, providing education) and administering Islamic punishments, teach audiences what TTP governance looks like in practice. This goes beyond combat modeling toward statebuilding, positioning the TTP as a viable alternative authority rather than a mere militant organization. Future research could attend more carefully to this dimension of jihadi behavioral skills content.

These findings empirically illustrate mechanisms theorized in prior work on online radicalization. Schlegel (2020) argues that online propaganda increases perceived self-efficacy through social persuasion and vicarious modeling; our analysis documents the content through which this process would operate across a systematic corpus, showing how repeated depictions of operations, weapons use, and governance are designed to build audience familiarity with jihadi participation. Similarly, Holt et al. (2017) find that internet-based radicalization functions as socialization into violent subcultures through sustained ideologically consistent exposure. This account is supported across the corpus, from long-form propaganda to short operations footage with behavioral skills content.

From Ideology to Behavior

Taken together, the codes identify the psychological processes TTP content is designed to engage (Table 6). To be clear, this content analysis is meant to identify the processes the message targets but cannot verify psychological change in audiences.

Table 6
Psychological Processes Targeted by TTP Video Content

Note. Clip counts are from the first author’s coding (N = 533 clips, 44 videos). The table identifies the processes the content is designed to engage; it does not measure their effect on viewers.

In the IMB model, information includes heuristics and implicit theories that guide decisions (Fisher et al., 2003). TTP videos communicate that democracy is apostasy, the state’s soldiers are kufr, and Muslims who serve the state have left the faith. Two processes follow, the first being social categorization (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Because the TTP fights a Muslim state, it cannot rely on a Muslim versus non-Muslim boundary; the Apostates, Kufr, and Near Enemy codes redraw the ingroup boundary so that Pakistani Muslims in uniform or serving Pakistan fall into the outgroup. The second is moral justification. Justification for Goals or Violence and Hypocrisy of Democratic States correspond to the mechanisms of moral disengagement, through which violence is reframed as righteous, compared favorably with the enemy’s conduct, and blamed on its targets (Bandura, 1999). These are the steps through which ideology gives permission to act.

In the IMB model, personal motivation rests on one’s attitude toward the behavior, whereas social motivation relies on perceived norms (Fisher & Fisher, 1992). In the corpus, personal motivation appears as outcome expectancies (Religious Reward), moral obligation (Religious Duty), and group-based anger at injustice (Injustice Against Muslim Community). Social motivation takes three forms: descriptive norms, in which people like the viewer are shown taking part (Endorsement); injunctive norms, in which the community is said to approve of jihad and martyrdom (Jihad, Support for Martyrdom, Suicide Attack; Cialdini et al., 1990); and prototypes, in which Exemplars and eulogy type videos help define what a good member looks like. Self-categorization theory holds that people who identify with a group infer its norms from prototypical members and act on them (Turner et al., 1987). Injustice, identity, and efficacy are the three core predictors of collective action in the social identity model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), and TTP videos supply all three.

Objective instruction on Behavioral Skills is rare: one clip shows how to make explosives. Behavioral skills content works on perceived capacity, through three of Bandura’s (1997) four sources of self-efficacy: vicarious experience of successful attacks on named targets (Target State Representatives, Effectiveness of Explosives Use), verbal persuasion that resolve and faith can substitute for training (Alternatives to Expertise), and repeated exposure to violence that lowers aversion (Graphic Content, Blood & Gore). Videos can deliver such modeling across a wide range of audiences and settings (Bandura, 2001b). Deconstruction breaks the state into reachable targets, lowering perceived difficulty. Mentions of “Cooperation and Goodwill” build collective efficacy, which fits the absence of lone-actor appeals in the corpus.

As a sequence, these processes describe how information translates into action: categorization and moral justification make violence against fellow Muslims permissible; anger and obligation make it desirable; and efficacy makes participation within the organization appear possible. The IMB model expects Information and Motivation to be operationalized through Behavioral skills (Fisher et al., 2003), and the corpus combines them accordingly: 177 of 533 clips (33.2%) contain all three dimensions.

Contribution

Applying the IMB model to TTP video content moves beyond thematic description to functional analysis of how propaganda seeks to produce behavioral change. Where framing theory identifies what messages say and social identity theory explains how group boundaries are constructed, the IMB framework specifies the psychological processes TTP content is designed to engage. This is particularly evident in the behavioral skills component, where the conceptualization of vicarious online efficacy transmission extends the IMB framework beyond its original contexts to radicalization, capturing a continuum of audience engagement from consumption to active participation that prior frameworks have not systematically assessed.

The study also illustrates a broader point about the utility of psychological frameworks in terrorism research. The TTP’s media operation is sophisticated not because it deploys novel content but because it integrates informational, motivational, and behavioral functions within a coherent and mutually reinforcing messaging strategy. Future research could examine whether these appeals produce the intended effects among actual audiences through experimental or survey methods, compare TTP’s messaging strategy with other locally embedded jihadi groups to test the generalizability of these findings, and track how the group’s media output evolved after 2020 as its organizational capacity grew.

Limitations of the Imb

The IMB model is limited to TTP’s worldview and messaging. It does not capture how audiences receive these messages, nor does it accommodate competing narratives that reach the same viewers. The model is indifferent to production techniques, the aesthetic and technical qualities of the videos, and the effectiveness of narrative techniques fall outside the model’s purview. Lastly, some content fits the frame awkwardly, for example, TTP’s media critical content is captured under Anti-Democracy (Anti-Press) codes and governance and service provision are captured at the organizational rather than individual levels.

Limitations of the Study

The study also suffers from limitations due to the research design and available content. First, the analysis is based solely on observable video content and does not directly measure audience beliefs or behavioral responses through experimentation. Any inferences about self-efficacy or behavioral change remain interpretive rather than empirically verified.

Second, language constraints limited the analysis of spoken Arabic and Pashto content. When TTP members spoke in Pashto, the translator relied on Umar Media’s subtitles. Arabic-language anashid present in many videos were not analyzed. This type of analysis is methodologically possible and has been pursued by other researchers (Pieslak et al., 2021).

Third, the corpus represents a convenience sample drawn from the Mobilizing Media Project archive rather than a probabilistic sample, and some content types may be over- or under-represented.

Fourth, reliability. In the original submission, the corpus was coded by the first author alone, and reliability was assessed after a second coder worked on a sample of nine videos, with poor results. For this revision, the coders recalibrated across two rounds, and the remaining 30 videos were coded independently by both coders with the finalized codebook. Even so, the qualitative analysis and the reported counts rest on the first author’s coding, and Information fell just below κ = .60 on the reliability sample (κ = .57), largely because the first author read Prescribed and Proscribed Conduct more broadly than the second coder. Findings that rest on the dimension-level distinction between informational and motivational content, and the counts for Prescribed and Proscribed Conduct, should be interpreted with caution. Finally, the second coder worked from the first author’s English translations, so the translations themselves were not independently verified.

Conclusion

The IMB model provides a productive framework for analyzing TTP video propaganda, moving beyond thematic accounts to distinguish the informational, motivational, and behavioral functions of messaging. Applied to a corpus of 44 videos spanning a critical period of TTP weakness and resurgence, the analysis reveals a sophisticated and coherent mobilization strategy that informs audiences, motivates participation, and builds the perceived capacity to act.

TTP videos present an expansive narrative of Islamic governance as both obligatory and achievable, situating the group’s campaign within a broader jihadist field while tailoring its appeals to a specifically Pakistani, Urdu-speaking Muslim audience. The group’s challenge of constructing legitimacy against a Muslim state is met through a distinctive messaging strategy that this study is among the first to systematically document and analyze.

These findings carry implications for counter-terrorism efforts. Disrupting TTP propaganda requires engaging not only with its informational claims; the historical grievances, apostasy accusations, and anti-democratic arguments but also with the motivational frames that invoke religious and communal obligation and the behavioral cues that normalize violence and model participation. Counter-narrative strategies that address more of these functional layers are more likely to be effective against complex multimodal messaging.

Author Contributions

S.J., W.M., and T.L. designed the study. W.M. and T.L. collected the data. S.J. translated the data, developed the codebook, and coded the full corpus. J.T. refined the codebook, coded the corpus independently as second coder, and contributed to the reliability assessment. S.J. conducted the analysis, created the visuals, and wrote the manuscript. W.M. and T.L. provided input on the theory, methods, and analysis sections. All authors contributed to critical revisions and feedback and approved the final manuscript.

Acknowledgements

We thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive and detailed feedback. We also thank our families and friends for their support.

AI Disclosure Statement

During revision, the authors used Claude (Anthropic) to suggest edits for clarity and structure and to check APA style. Claude was also used to compute the intercoder agreement statistics, organize and aggregate the code frequencies, write the replication script, and produce Figure 1 and the tables. The authors reviewed and verified the output and take full responsibility for the content.

Funding

This work was supported by the Minerva Research Initiative of the U.S. Department of Defense, through the Air Force Office of Scientific Research as part of the Mobilizing Media research program (Grant# FA9550-15-1-0373; PI redacted). All opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the authors.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare. 

Data Availability Statement

The corpus analyzed in this study consists of TTP propaganda videos collected by W.M. and T.L. as part of the Mobilizing Media research program. Because the videos contain graphic and violent extremist content and were collected and are held under that program, they cannot be shared publicly. The full codebook, with definitions and examples, is provided in Appendix 1, and clip-level reliability results are reported in the manuscript and Appendix 2. 

The clip-level coded data for all 44 videos (video and clip identifiers, clip timestamps, and each coder’s codes), the codebook, and the script used to compute the agreement statistics and code frequencies reported here are archived on Zenodo (https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23326729). The videos and their transcripts contain graphic extremist content and are held under the Mobilizing Media project, so they are not included in the archive.    

Coding was performed in NVivo and Microsoft Excel using the codebook in Appendix 1. Reliability statistics (percent agreement, Cohen’s κ, PABAK, and Gwet’s AC1) were computed with standard formulas, which are described in the Methods. The R script used to compute them are available from the corresponding author on request.

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Appendices

Appendix 1
The list of featured TTP release dates, titles, and runtime.

Appendix 2
Codebook With Code Frequencies and Intercoder Agreement (Final Round)

Note. Clips (n) = clips in which each coder applied the code across all 44 videos (N = 533 clips); the first author’s counts are those reported in the text. Videos (n) = videos with at least one such clip in the first author’s coding. Agreement statistics (Agree., κ, PABAK, AC1) compare the two coders’ independent coding of the 30 videos (428 clips) coded after the codebook was finalized; for dimension and parent rows, a clip counts as coded if any code beneath it was applied. Service Provision was applied only in “Services Provided in South Waziristan,” a calibration video; neither coder applied it in the final round, so κ is undefined. κ is unstable for rare codes; read it alongside percent agreement, PABAK and AC1. κ = Cohen’s kappa; PABAK = prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa; AC1 = Gwet’s AC1.

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