epistemically suspect beliefs
Definition
Epistemically suspect beliefs refers to beliefs in claims that contradict substantial scientific evidence and expert consensus, encompassing unverified conspiracy theories, fake news, and pseudoscience. Such beliefs are associated with negative societal outcomes including heightened discrimination against marginalised groups, reduced public health compliance, and weakened societal cohesion. Research comparing Fringe believers (those who accept implausible claims) with Mainstream believers suggests that these beliefs may arise less from cognitive laziness than from operating within an alternative epistemic framework that devalues conventional markers of evidence quality. Fringe believers consistently provided fewer normative justifications when evaluating expert reports and were more likely to substitute objective evidence with self-generated assumptions, a pattern that held across two independent studies with different expert domains.
Sources: Robson et al. (2024)
Related Terms
- misinformation (1 shared article)
- reasoning (1 shared article)
- content analysis (1 shared article)
- conspiracy theories (1 shared article)
Applications
Epistemically Suspect Beliefs and Evidence Evaluation
Fringe believers of epistemically suspect claims provided significantly fewer justifications referencing normative criteria such as an expert's field, ability, or consistency when rating forensic or medical expert reports. This pattern was consistent across both studies, suggesting that those who hold epistemically suspect beliefs apply a systematically different standard when assessing what counts as credible evidence, rather than simply expending less effort.
Sources: Robson et al. (2024)
Epistemically Suspect Beliefs and Cognitive Miserliness
The Miserly Hypothesis holds that belief in epistemically suspect claims results from reduced cognitive effort during information evaluation. Evidence for this account was mixed: Fringe believers wrote fewer words than Mainstream believers in one study but not the other, and both groups were equally capable of distinguishing high-quality from low-quality expert reports.
Sources: Robson et al. (2024)
Epistemically Suspect Beliefs and Self-generated Justifications
Across combined data from two studies, Fringe believers were significantly more likely than Mainstream believers to rely on self-generated justifications when evaluating expert evidence, drawing on their own subjective assumptions and external opinions rather than the information provided. This tendency aligns with the Information Preference Hypothesis, which proposes that epistemically suspect beliefs stem from valuing non-normative information sources over conventional evidence standards.
Sources: Robson et al. (2024)
