Is so-called \u201csalad bar extremism\u201d \u2013 where individuals \u201camalgamate\u201d disparate ideas, grievances, and \u201cideological fragments\u201d into their worldviews (Gartenstein-Ross & Plant, 2023) \u2013 an essentially Western phenomenon? Thus far the bulk of the illuminating analyses of the phenomenon have come from a predominantly Western viewpoint. This short commentary examines if the evolving \u201csalad bar\u201d digital radicalization threat in Southeast Asia is of perhaps a different timbre.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In Southeast Asia, since the September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda attacks in the United States, and particularly following the mass-casualty nightclub bombings by the Southeast Asian Al Qaeda affiliate, Jemaah Islamiyah, on October 12, 2002, the predominant transnational terrorist threat has been Islamist (Internal Security Department, 2025a; Ramakrishna, 2025). That said, while neo-Nazi ideas have circulated in Southeast Asia throughout the 20th century (Mustaffa, 2021), since late 2020, regional analysts have noted the emergence of \u201cself-radicalized\u201d youth animated by far-right extremist (FRE) notions of the Great Replacement Theory \u2013 alleging that White populations in the West are gradually being replaced by non-Whites via immigration and the superior fertility rates of the latter (Ramakrishna, 2024b). Additionally, White supremacist Great Replacement tropes have been adapted to a Southeast Asian context. For instance, TikTok-based Austronesian supremacists in maritime Southeast Asia have adapted \u201cWestern FRE narratives\u201d like the Great Replacement Theory to \u201cdemonise local Rohingya refugees and other perceived non-indigenous communities,\u201d promoting violence to protect the demographic and political paramountcy of indigenous populations (Hasbi et al., 2025). In Singapore, one 18-year-old self-radicalized ethnic Chinese teen regarded East Asians \u2013 Chinese, Korean, and Japanese \u2013 as \u201csuperior ethnicities\u201d and considered himself \u2013 not a White but rather an \u201cEast Asian supremacist.\u201d Adapting \u201cthe Great Replacement Theory\u201d to a Singaporean context, he believed \u201cthat violence was necessary to prevent the Chinese majority in Singapore from being displaced by\u201d a supposedly \u201crapidly growing Malay population\u201d (Jacob, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Against the evolving regional threatscape just described, between September 2025 and July 2026, Singapore encountered its first three cases of youth radicalization into a \u201csalad bar of ideologies.\u201d These cases demonstrate the presence, but not prevalence, of salad bar ideologies in Singapore. While a more comprehensive region-wide analysis is not possible for reasons of space, interrogating these three Singaporean cases more closely may shed some preliminary light on the question posed at the start of this commentary: is salad bar extremism in Southeast Asia \u2013 as seen in the Singapore examples for which some data are publicly available \u2013 fundamentally different from cases seen in the West? First, a brief overview of the three Singaporean cases:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In September 2025, Singapore\u2019s Internal Security Department reported the first case of online radicalization into a \u201c\u2018salad bar\u2019 of extremist ideologies<\/a>,\u201d a 14-year-old male youth \u2013 we can call him Case X (Internal Security Department, 2025b, para. 3). He was a staunch supporter of both the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al Qaeda. He concurrently subscribed to \u201cfar-right extremist ideologies,\u201d which exposed him to violent anti-Semitic ideas and \u201ctrue crime content\u201d (to be discussed below). Additionally, he espoused \u201caspects of far-left extremism,\u201d supporting socialism and communism, and eschewing capitalism, which he considered a \u201cJewish ideology.\u201d Moreover, the youth self-identified as an \u201cincel\u201d \u2013 violently resentful towards attractive but unavailable women and men perceived as more sexually successful (Koh, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In the second case \u2013 Case Y \u2013 reported in June 2026, a 19-year-old student was reportedly self-radicalized online by what the Singaporean authorities now termed Composite Violent Extremism (CoVE) (Internal Security Department, 2026a). On the one hand, he subscribed to pro-Hamas, anti-LGBTQ, anti-Western, and Islamist accelerationist beliefs. He supported \u201cHamas and their violent actions, including their killing of civilians, which he viewed as a form of jihad.\u201d Additionally, he made online posts inciting violence against the LGBTQ community. While his anti-Western and anti-LGBTQ ideas were influenced by violent Islamist material online, he also espoused \u201cviolent incel ideologies.\u201d Hence, he had \u201cfantasised about committing violence against certain groups of people in school,\u201d including \u201ccouples in relationships.\u201d Like Case X, Case Y had also been exposed to true crime content online (Anthony, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Case Z \u2013 reported in July 2026 \u2013 involved a 14-year-old, the third CoVE case in Singapore since September 2025 (Internal Security Department, 2026b). He had been immersed in first-person shooter games on the online gaming platform Roblox, including games recreating the 1999 Columbine High School incident. He had been exposed to violent gore, mass shooting, and true crime content as well. He had planned to \u201cconduct a mass-casualty attack against non-Muslim teachers and schoolmates at his school.\u201d He eventually chose \u201ca kitchen knife and penknife\u201d for stabbing attacks after \u201crepeated online viewings of ISIS execution and stabbing tutorial videos.\u201d Inspired by FRE terrorists like the 2019 Christchurch attacker Tarrant and other mass shooters, he had planned to livestream the attack. Notably, Case Z was influenced by the fact that \u201cseveral mass shooters had been victims of bullying,\u201d and their violence represented \u201cretaliation against those who had wronged them\u201d (Internal Security Department, 2026b, paras. 16, 19\u201320).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 3N (Narratives, Networks, and Needs<\/em>) framework developed by Kruglanski et al. (2019) may be helpful to compare the psychosocial profiles of the three Singapore cases with how scholars have described Western cases of salad bar radicalization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By this we mean a \u201cviolence-justifying ideology\u201d that suggests that out-group violence is morally and religiously legitimated and desirable (Kruglanski et al., 2019, p. 3). Salad bar ideologies appropriate symbols from various ideological sources without committing to the broader doctrines (Horgan & Shayler, 2026; Perliger, 2026; Rousseau & Veissi\u00e8re, 2026). Despite that, the literature suggests that Western salad bar ideologies are often rooted in extreme far-right narratives (Baele, 2026; Horgan & Shayler, 2026; Perliger, 2026). In all three cases, exposure to online extremist narratives was clearly a factor in their radicalization. However, far-right narratives did not appear to be the default base in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Case X seems to be the closest representation of a Western salad bar ideology. He was exposed to diverse extremist narratives. One genre was \u201ctrue crime content.\u201d The True Crime Community (TCC) is a \u201cbroad term used to refer to an online community of superfans of true crime, mass shooters, serial killers and school shooters\u201d (Chernov Hwang, 2026, p. 75). Violent TCC members, idolizing mass shooters, attempt to carry out similar attacks in \u201cmemetic fashion\u201d (Chernov Hwang, 2026, p. 75). Case X also imbibed \u201cviolent anti-Semitic beliefs\u201d from FRE content; far-left content that was \u201canti-Zionist\u201d and \u201canti-imperialist\u201d; violent Islamist ideas from ISIS and Al Qaeda sources; and as mentioned, incel grievances (Koh, 2025). Notably, authorities assessed that the youth\u2019s \u201cunderstanding of far-right extremist and far-left extremist concepts\u201d was \u201cshallow\u201d and he \u201csupported seemingly conflicting aspects of these ideologies\u201d (Internal Security Department, 2025b, para. 9, footnote 9). <\/p>\n\n\n\n Following the October 2023 Hamas assault on Israel, Case Y was exposed to a \u201cproliferation of pro-Hamas narratives online,\u201d as well as \u201csocial media posts\u201d by a \u201cniche online Islamist extremist group which subscribed to violent accelerationist ideas\u201d (Anthony, 2026). This Islamist accelerationist narrative \u2013 hailing the victorious Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham\u2019s (HTS) offensive against the Assad regime in late 2024 as well as the October 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel \u2013 called for generating \u201cchaos\u201d through \u201cviolence to establish a future with Islam as the leading global civilisation\u201d (Anthony, 2026). For Case Y, Islamist radical ideology appears to be his basis of radicalization. He appropriated TCC content, as well as \u201cviolent incel ideology\u201d inspired by school shooter Elliot Rodger. He also subscribed to the \u201cblack pill\u201d narrative which posits that some men are \u201cdoomed to fail in romantic pursuits and will never find a partner\u201d (Anthony, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Case Z was also deeply immersed in online extremist narratives. Influenced by online ISIS content, he supported the group\u2019s killing of non-Muslims and LGBTQ individuals. His exposure to FRE content, \u201cincluding anti-Semitic and neo-Nazi narratives,\u201d eventually led him to support \u201cAdolf Hitler\u2019s killing of Jews\u201d as he held the latter responsible for \u201cmistreating Palestinians in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.\u201d He was influenced by the U.S. neo-Nazi network Atomwaffen Division\u2019s accelerationist ideas too. Additionally, Case Z embraced the narrative of White supremacy, regarding himself \u201cmore \u2018White\u2019\u201d and \u201cfair-skinned.\u201d Finally, as noted he consumed violent gore and mass shooting content and ideas on TCC sites (Internal Security Department, 2026b, para. 18).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, in all three cases of salad bar extremism in Singapore, there was clear symbolic appropriation from different ideological sources without doctrinal commitment. However, unlike Western salad bar extremists, FRE did not appear to be the default base of extremism. The cases highlighted in this commentary consider Islamist narratives to be the base of their extremist beliefs while adopting FRE and TCC symbols and language to justify violence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The network serves as \u201cconduits through which individuals get acquainted with, and embrace, the ideological narrative that the network espouses\u201d (Kruglanski et al., 2019, p. 51). Western examples of salad bar radicalization often emphasize the incel\/manosphere (Baele, 2026; Horgan & Shayler, 2026; McCauley, 2026; Perliger, 2026; Rousseau & Veissi\u00e8re, 2026) and the TCC\/mass-shooter fandom (Baele, 2026; Rousseau & Veissi\u00e8re, 2026). These communities are common between the Western and Southeast Asian salad bar extremists. However, regional analysts assess that the presence of more nihilistic communities like 764 (Rousseau & Veissi\u00e8re, 2026) has not been confirmed in Southeast Asia (Basha & Mok, 2026; Mustaffa, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Case X was very much exposed to such online networks. He was not just active in online chat groups supportive of FRE, TCC, and incel ideas, he joined \u201cpro-ISIS and jihadist communities online\u201d as well. One online contact, an alleged Iraq-based ISIS supporter, offered to \u201chelp him plan an attack in Singapore,\u201d which, fortunately, Case X did not pursue. Case X went as far as to pledge allegiance to the ISIS network and saw it as his duty \u201cto garner support for its cause\u201d (Koh, 2025).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Likewise, Case Y joined several \u201conline religious discussion groups\u201d (Anthony, 2026), where he was exposed to violent Islamist anti-Western and anti-LGBTQ content. His immersion in the aforementioned niche Islamist accelerationist network\u2019s private chat group in early 2025 deepened his radicalization. As part of his pledge of allegiance to this group, he took pictures of two popular tourist spots in Singapore, uploading them on his social media account as part of an e-publication authored by group members. Finally, Case Y\u2019s active engagement with violent incel and TCC forums influenced him to both self-identify as an incel, and to make \u201conline posts threatening to kill or rape women,\u201d dehumanizing the latter as \u201cfoid,\u201d meaning \u201cfemale humanoid\u201d (Anthony, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Case Z likewise joined ISIS online communities. Consequently, he began supporting the group\u2019s killing of non-Muslims and was \u201cwilling to attack non-Muslims if instructed by ISIS\u201d (Internal Security Department, 2026b, para. 17). At the same time, his immersion in TCC-linked online gaming forums enabled him to chance upon ISIS supporter Omar Mateen\u2019s 2016 mass shooting in a Florida gay nightclub. Case Z not only \u201cadmired Mateen\u2019s high kill count during the attack,\u201d notably, he \u201cidolised Mateen as he related with the latter\u2019s experience of being bullied\u201d (Internal Security Department, 2026b, para. 17) \u2013 a key point which we shall discuss next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall, salad bar extremists in Singapore and the West appeared to be in similar incel\/manosphere and TCC\/mass shooter communities. However, they are not confirmed to be in more niche communities such as the 764 sexual exploitation network. Additionally, ISIS networks appeared to be dominant in all three cases in Singapore, but Islamist networks were not highlighted in Western salad bar cases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ultimately, the need for significance<\/em> <\/em><\/strong>\u2013 \u201cthe fundamental desire to matter, to be someone, have respect\u201d (Kruglanski et al., 2019, p. 42) \u2013 is what drives much violent extremist behavior, regardless of personal and ideological factors. This basic need can arguably be gleaned in all three cases. The need for belonging and status seems to be a common theme across Western and Singapore salad bar cases. Both Western and Singapore salad bar extremists have also reported some levels of humiliation, through bullying or the inability to experience sexual pleasure (Perliger, 2026; Rousseau & Veissi\u00e8re, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In late 2023 Case X reportedly \u201cbecame more self-conscious about his appearance\u201d and came across incel \u201clooksmaxxing\u201d content \u2013 an incel subculture providing dubious advice on how to enhance one\u2019s physical appearance on social media (Farrell, 2024; Koh, 2025). This hinted at his underlying need to matter, to enjoy the adulation of the opposite sex; his resentment at being unsuccessful in this regard; and his ensuing susceptibility to incel appeals. Similarly, Case Y was \u201cunhappy about his inability to pursue romantic relationships\u201d (Anthony, 2026). Like Case X, he subscribed to \u201clooksmaxxing\u201d content in an effort to improve his physical appearance (Anthony, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n As for Case Z, he claimed to be a victim of school bullying. Hence, he identified with several mass shooters who had themselves been victims of bullying and resonated with their acts of violence as a form of retaliation against those who had wronged them. Thus, while playing online violent games, he \u201cimagined his bullies as the in-game non-player characters (NPCs) and victims depicted within the videos, and himself as the perpetrator of the violent acts\u201d (Internal Security Department, 2026b, para. 16). It was also why he could relate with the 2016 Florida nightclub shooter Omar Mateen, as the latter had himself been a victim of bullying. In short, in all three Singaporean cases, the desire to matter, to restore lost significance was clearly a driver in their respective radicalization trajectories (Internal Security Department, 2026b, paras. 16\u201317).<\/p>\n\n\n\n What do the three Singaporean \u201csalad bar\u201d cases suggest by way of a preliminary assessment? First and foremost, to answer the key question set out at the start of this commentary, there appears to be nothing specially \u201cSingaporean\u201d about the three cases. While the specific grievances and violent networks in Southeast Asia might differ, the radicalizing platforms and mechanisms into \u201csalad bar extremism\u201d seem broadly similar to what has been observed in the West and elsewhere (Deliso, 2023; Kidwai, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Four key points can perhaps be further underscored:<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, youth everywhere are particularly susceptible to extremist manipulation, because during the emotionally turbulent teenage years, the executive reasoning parts of their brains are less developed than the emotional centers. Thus, teenagers often come across as impulsive, rash, and prone to pursuing simplistic, black-and-white answers to complex issues. In short, they are in a \u201ctumultuous biological, cognitive, social and emotional transition to adulthood\u201d (Goh, 2011).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, being immersed in online extremist networks of any ideological stripe \u2013 in essence \u201cecho chambers\u201d (Atari et al., 2022; B\u00e9langer et al., 2026) \u2013 for several hours a day, ensures that group polarization <\/em>(Sunstein, 2009) toward radicalized mindsets is more likely to occur \u2013 whether in Singapore or elsewhere.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Third, research indicates that a radicalizing youth need not develop a completely coherent understanding of extremist ideological concepts; a cut-and-paste approach suffices for a basic working understanding. The youth simply needs to feel personally satisfied that he has good enough reasons \u2013 however hazy and internally contradictory, as in \u201csalad bar\u201d radicalization \u2013 for engaging in extremist violence (Ramakrishna, 2024a).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fourth, and finally, this is probably the crucial point: as former FBI Director Christopher Wray explained at a U.S. Senate hearing in September 2020, while a \u201csalad bar of ideologies\u201d comprises \u201ca little bit of this, a little bit of that,\u201d what the radicalized youth are \u201creally about is the violence <\/em>[emphasis added]\u201d (as cited in Horgan & Shayler, 2026, p. 2). In short, what the \u201csalad bar\u201d phenomenon may be masking is the deeper current of Nihilistic Violent Extremism (NVE) of which TCC \u2013 very apparent in the three Singaporean cases \u2013 is a key element (Chernov Hwang, 2026). NVE violence lacks an ideological motivation (Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2025) and is essentially driven by personal issues (Ware, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In sum, the precise mix of ideological fragments in the Singaporean cases did not actually motivate the violence. It merely legitimized \u2013 however idiosyncratically \u2013 the violence the youth already felt like engaging in, driven by their deep need for restoring a perceived lost significance. <\/em>The latter was a result of perceived personal affronts: bullying and lack of romantic\/sexual success. <\/em>In other words, it was not quite \u201cviolence for its own sake\u201d (Cassam, 2026, p. 1), but rather violence to restore a perceived loss of significance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The NVE phenomenon has certainly been apparent in the wider Southeast Asian region. For instance, in November 2025, an Indonesian youth attempted to bomb his high school in Jakarta. On his toy gun he had inscribed a slew of FRE concepts and names such as \u201cBrenton Tarrant. Welcome to Hell.\u201d The Indonesian police however found that the youth had been influenced by TCC more so than FRE ideas per se. He was an example of \u201cmemetic radicalisation\u201d (Atha, 2026). Notably, his classmates alleged he had been a victim of bullying (Tito, 2025). <\/p>\n\n\n\n Subsequently, in June 2026, two youths aged 14 and 15 were involved in a school shooting allegedly from the 764 network. Also, part of the online NVE community, the 764 network typically employs sexual blackmail to manipulate youth to perpetrate violent acts (Chernov Hwang, 2026). Nevertheless, claims of the involvement of the 764 network in Southeast Asian cases have been disputed (Basha & Mok, 2026; Mustaffa, 2026). The 14-year-old had allegedly been playing the \u201cviolent sandbox game Gorebox and had posted gun-shooting content online shortly before the attack\u201d (Cepeda, 2026). Again, it was reported that a grudge over school bullying may have been a factor in the incident (Rivera, 2026).<\/p>\n\n\n\n All this is to assert that so-called \u201csalad bar extremism\u201d is not solely a Western phenomenon, as seen in the three cases in Singapore. These Singaporean cases highlight that there appears to be some resemblance to Western salad bar extremism. Youths have been radicalized through online platforms and were influenced by a confluence of incoherent ideologies. In some ways, there seems to be nothing uniquely Singaporean\/Southeast Asian about salad bar extremism in the region. Going forward, holistic, upstream strategies for dealing with youth radicalization into the phenomenon \u2013 revolving around building multi-dimensional youth resilience against violent extremism (Hussin & Mohamed, 2026) \u2013 especially including the nihilistic variety, would appear to be increasingly apt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No empirical data was analyzed for this manuscript<\/p>\n\n\n\n The authors report no conflict of interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This research received no external funding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n Anthony, D. A. (2026, June 24). Two Singaporeans dealt with under ISA; teen subscribed to \u201csalad bar\u201d mix of extremist ideologies<\/em>. CNA. https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/isd-radicalised-teen-israel-hamas-salad-bar-extremism-6205671<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Atari, M., Davani, A. M., Kogon, D., Kennedy, B., Ani Saxena, N., Anderson, I., & Dehghani, M. (2022). Morally homogeneous networks and radicalism. Social Psychological and Personality Science<\/em>, 13<\/em>(6), 999\u20131009. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1177\/19485506211059329<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Atha, C. (2026, January 7). The Jakarta bombing: Youth digital radicalisation and the urgent need for adaptive PCVE responses. Global Network on Extremism and Technology<\/em>. https:\/\/gnet-research.org\/2026\/01\/07\/the-jakarta-bombing-youth-digital-radicalisation-and-the-urgent-need-for-adaptive-pcve-responses\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Baele, S. J. (2026). Why the \u201csalad bar\u201d might actually help extremism research \u2013 A reply to Horgan and Shayler. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e359159. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00060<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Basha, S., & Mok, B. (2026, September 18). The afterlife of the Tacloban shooting: Nihilistic violent extremism in the Philippines. Global Network on Extremism and Technology<\/em>. https:\/\/gnet-research.org\/2026\/09\/18\/the-afterlife-of-the-tacloban-shooting-nihilistic-violent-extremism-in-the-philippines\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n B\u00e9langer, J. J., Snook, D. W., Ahmed, M. R., & Adam-Troian, J. (2026). The radicalization syndrome: Reciprocal dynamics of obsessive passion and deliberate engagement. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e912056. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00067<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Cassam, Q. (2026). Extremism without ideology. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e945134. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00062<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Cepeda, M. (2026, July 1). Philippine school shooting shines light on global online extremist network targeting children. The Straits Times<\/em>. https:\/\/www.straitstimes.com\/asia\/se-asia\/philippine-school-shooting-shines-light-on-global-online-extremist-network-targeting-children<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Chernov Hwang, J. (2026). The nihilistic violent extremist ecosystem: A global threat. In Global terrorism index 2026: Measuring the impact of terrorism<\/em> (pp. 74\u201376). Institute for Economics & Peace. https:\/\/www.visionofhumanity.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/03\/Global-Terrorism-Index-2026-Report.pdf<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Deliso, M. (2023, May 31). The challenges to US security posed by \u201csalad bar\u201d extremism<\/em>. ABC News. https:\/\/abcnews.com\/US\/challenges-us-security-posed-salad-bar-extremism\/story?id=99642909<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Farrell, R. (2024, March 26). Inside looksmaxxing, the extreme cosmetic social media trend<\/em>. BBC. <\/em>https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/culture\/article\/20240326-inside-looksmaxxing-the-extreme-cosmetic-social-media-trend<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Gartenstein-Ross, D., & Plant, T. (2023, September 20). An evolving threat landscape: Composite violent extremism and prevention efforts. Global Network on Extremism and Technology<\/em>. https:\/\/gnet-research.org\/2023\/09\/20\/an-evolving-threat-landscape-composite-violent-extremism-and-prevention-efforts\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Goh, C. L. (2011). How, what and why: Understanding them \u2013 A psychological overview of the youth<\/em> [Conference presentation]. Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism Symposium on the Dynamics of Youth and Terrorism, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hasbi, A. H., Ismail, N., & Basha, S. (2025). Key trends in digital extremism 2024: The resilience and expansion of jihadist and far-right movements. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 17<\/em>(1). https:\/\/rsis.edu.sg\/ctta-newsarticle\/key-trends-in-digital-extremism-2024-the-resilience-and-expansion-of-jihadist-and-far-right-movements\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Horgan, J., & Shayler, M. (2026). Why the \u201csalad bar of ideologies\u201d does not help us understand contemporary violent extremism. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e607682. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00057<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hussin, S., & Mohamed, M. M. H. (2026, July 14). From prevention to resilience: A whole-of-community approach through the Community Resilience Framework. RSIS Commentary<\/em>, CO26151. https:\/\/rsis.edu.sg\/rsis-publication\/rsis\/from-prevention-to-resilience-a-whole-of-community-approach-through-the-community-resilience-framework\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Institute for Strategic Dialogue. (2025, May 8). Terror without ideology? The rise of nihilistic violence<\/em>. https:\/\/www.isdglobal.org\/digital-dispatch\/terror-without-ideology-the-rise-of-nihilistic-violence-an-isd-investigation\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Internal Security Department. (2025a). Singapore terrorism threat assessment report 2025<\/em>. Ministry of Home Affairs. https:\/\/www.isd.gov.sg\/news-and-resources\/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2025\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Internal Security Department. (2025b, September 9). Issuance of restriction orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) against two Singaporeans<\/em> [Press release]. Ministry of Home Affairs. https:\/\/www.isd.gov.sg\/news-and-resources\/issuance-of-restriction-orders-under-the-internal-security-act-isa-against-two-singaporeans\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Internal Security Department. (2026a, June 24). Issuance of orders under the Internal Security Act (ISA) against two Singaporeans, and updates on previous ISA orders<\/em> [Press release]. Ministry of Home Affairs. https:\/\/www.isd.gov.sg\/news-and-resources\/issuance-of-orders-under-the-internal-security-act–isa–against-two-singaporeans–and-updates-on-previous-isa-orders\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Internal Security Department. (2026b, July 27). Issuance of orders of detention under the Internal Security Act (ISA) against three self-radicalised Singaporean youths<\/em> [Press release]. Ministry of Home Affairs. https:\/\/www.isd.gov.sg\/news-and-resources\/issuance-of-orders-of-detention-under-the-internal-security-act–isa–against-three-self-radicalised-singaporean-youths\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Jacob, C. (2025, February 10). Singaporean teen who identified as \u201cEast Asian supremacist\u201d detained under ISA<\/em>. CNA. https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/youth-detained-isa-far-right-extremist-ideologies-4927826<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Kidwai, S. A. (2024, September 26). Salad bar extremism. Modern Diplomacy. <\/em>https:\/\/moderndiplomacy.eu\/2024\/09\/26\/salad-bar-extremism\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Koh, F. (2025, September 9). Singapore picks up first case of incel radicalised by mixing far-right, far-left and ISIS ideologies<\/em>. CNA. https:\/\/www.channelnewsasia.com\/singapore\/isd-isa-extremism-far-right-isis-incel-radicalised-5339406<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Kruglanski, A. W., B\u00e9langer, J. J., & Gunaratna, R. (2019). The three pillars of radicalization: Needs, narratives, and networks<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n McCauley, C. (2026). The end of ideological violence. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e145270. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00066<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Mustaffa, M. (2021, July 14). Right-wing extremism has deep roots in Southeast Asia. Global Network on Extremism and Technology<\/em>. https:\/\/gnet-research.org\/2021\/07\/14\/right-wing-extremism-has-deep-roots-in-southeast-asia\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Mustaffa, M. (2026, July 6). Why Tacloban reads TCC, not 764. The Deep Dive<\/em>. https:\/\/chasseur.group\/why-tacloban-reads-tcc-not-764\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Perliger, A. (2026). The erosion of conceptual clarity in the study of political violence. advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e824472. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00059<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ramakrishna, K. (2024a). The role of ideology in radicalisation. In J. Busher, L. Malkki, & S. Marsden (Eds.), The Routledge handbook on radicalisation and countering radicalisation<\/em> (pp. 71\u201384). Routledge. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.4324\/9781003035848-7<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ramakrishna, K. (2024b, January 29). Understanding Singapore\u2019s \u201cmulticultural White supremacists.\u201d RSIS Commentary. <\/em>https:\/\/rsis.edu.sg\/rsis-publication\/rsis\/understanding-singapores-multicultural-white-supremacists\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Ramakrishna, K. (2025). Jemaah Islamiyah, ISIS and beyond: Tracking the evolving challenge of violent extremism in Southeast Asia (2001\u20132025).<\/em> World Scientific.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Rivera, V. S. (2026, June 22). Three dead in Philippines high school shooting over bullying \u201cgrudge.\u201d<\/em> BBC News. https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/cjegy777xw5o<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Rousseau, C., & Veissi\u00e8re, S. (2026). Shifts and continuity in contemporary violent extremism: Moving toward a dynamic and developmental understanding? advances.in\/psychology<\/em>, 1<\/em>, e631837. https:\/\/doi.org\/10.56296\/aip00068<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Going to extremes: How like minds unite and divide<\/em>. Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Tito, A. (2025, November 7). Injured teen linked to Jakarta school explosion transferred to ICU, classmates say he was bullied. Jakarta Globe. <\/em>https:\/\/jakartaglobe.id\/news\/injured-teen-linked-to-jakarta-school-explosion-transferred-to-icu-classmates-say-he-was-bullied<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\nCase Y<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Case Z<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Analysis<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
The Narrative<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Network<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
The Need<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Assessment<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Data Availability Statement<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Conflicts of Interest<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Funding<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
References<\/h2>\n\n\n\n